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Abstract  
This paper seeks to develop and analyze a relationship between venture capital 
investment, rhetorical corporate strategies, and public stock performance. Examining 
every firm since 2000 that went public at a market cap of 1 billion USD or above, I analyze 
the rhetoric of unicorns and its relation to risk. Using SEC archives of S-1 financial 
documents and two sentiment dictionaries, I attempt to capture levels of positive language 
in firms’ business summaries and negative language in its risk factors. Using this data, I 
test the correlation between a firm’s venture capital investment and its S-1 language, as 
well as the relationship between a firm’s S-1 rhetoric and its ensuing stock performance 
as a public company. A significant positive correlation is established between venture 
capital investment and a firm’s levels of positive language in their business summaries, as 
well as a significant positive correlation between venture capital investment and a firm’s 
levels of negative language in their risk factors. Impacts of business summary language on 
daily, weekly, and monthly returns after a firm’s IPO are negligible.  
 
1. Introduction
This paper seeks to develop and analyze a connection between venture capital investment,
rhetorical corporate strategies, and public stock performance. I examine every firm since 2000
that went public on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ at a market cap of 1 billion
USD or above. These firms are commonly referred to as “unicorns”, defined as privately-held
companies with a valuation at or above 1 billion USD.
Using SEC archives of S-1 financial documents, I collect and analyze the business summary
and risk factor section of each firm’s S-1. The business summary section provides an overview
of the firm and includes details such as its mission statement, clients, supply chain, future
strategy, and revenues. I use this section of the S-1 as an analog to a unicorn firm’s “pitch”,
the presentation startup companies make to prospective venture capital firms. The risk
factor section of the S-1 is intended to disclose significant factors that would make a firm’s
IPO especially risky or uncertain. I use this section of the S-1 as a proxy for a firm’s perceived
risk.
Text analysis is conducted using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) module,
a proprietary text analysis software. I use LIWC’s own textual sentiment word bank, which
contains over fifty di↵erent text analysis categories, as well as a word bank compiled by
Notre Dame researchers Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald. Loughran & McDonald applied
linguistic analysis to financial documents to develop word lists of negative financial words,
as well as banks for positive, uncertain, litigious, strong, and weak language. Text analysis
in a purely financial context will help capture an accurate assessment of a firm’s risk, as
measured by a text analysis of its risk factors.
Using this data, I test the correlation between a firm’s venture capital investment and its
S-1 language. Given the nature of the venture capital investment process and the importance
it places on firms’ pitches, I hypothesize that firms with venture capital investment will use
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more positive and rhetorical language in their business summaries relative to firms without
VC investment. I also hypothesize that firms with venture capital investment will be riskier
than their non-VC counterparts, as quantified by negative financial text sentiment in each
observed firm’s S-1 risk factor section.
To examine the relationship between S-1 rhetorical strategies and security performance, I
collect observed firms’ daily, weekly, and monthly stock returns following the IPO. I also col-
lect the market return for each firm over the same observed period to determine each stock’s
abnormal return. I hypothesize that firms using higher levels of rhetorical and emotional
language will be correlated with lower relative returns.
2. Historical Background
The preponderance of “unicorns”, privately-held companies with a valuation at or above
1 billion USD, has grown exponentially in the past ten years. The term unicorn is a 21st
century invention. Venture capitalist Aileen Lee dubbed the word in 2013, when only 39
firms qualified for unicorn status (Lee, 2013). Today, 575 companies fit the label of a unicorn,
and an additional 179 former unicorns have successfully been acquired or existed into an IPO
(Crunchbase, accessed 2020). Unicorns are now so common that, ironically, the metaphor is
no longer apt.
Such a sharp uptake in the number of unicorns is correlated with the growth of the venture
capital firms which fund them. Venture capital (abbreviated VC) is a form of private equity
financing for early-stage startup companies. The focus of VC investment has shifted in
recent years. Once concentrated in seed and early-stage investment for early-stage firms, the
majority of VC funding has now flowed to deals with late-stage, established startups. The
implications of such a change are significant. So-called “super-giant” deals, equity funding
rounds totaling over 100 million USD, accounted for 56 percent of VC dollar volume in 2018.
As evidenced by Figure 1, these types of deals were a rarity as recently as 2013. Super-giant
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deals have become so common that analysts have dubbed a new term, “hyper-giant” rounds,
to describe equity funding rounds totaling over 250 million USD. Figure 2 captures a sharp
uptick in the volume of VC funding for late-stage firms over the past ten years.
Figure 1: Credit: Crunchbase News, 2018
Figure 2: Credit: Crunchbase News, 2020
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The implications of these drastic changes have consequences for other financial markets.
Delaying exits allow companies to avoid releasing financial data required by the SEC, and
prevents retail investors with no access to private markets from realizing any future gains.
Conventional wisdom dictates that the clearest way for private companies to raise money is
to launch an initial public o↵ering (IPO). Google, for example, raised just $31.6 million in
venture funding before it went public at a market cap of $21.3 billion in August 2004 (Rowley
2018). Nowadays, firms are increasingly able to raise gargantuan sums of capital through
private investors, bypassing traditional growth trajectories for unicorn startups. Google went
public six years after its founding in September 2008; it took Facebook eight years before its
IPO in 2012. Nowadays established, large-cap unicorns have little need to go public as they
raise billions of dollars on the private market. It took Uber ten years and approximately
24.2 billion USD in funding before going public, and even well-known large-cap companies
such as Airbnb are still private 12 years after its founding.
Drastic changes in venture capital markets may have reached a tipping point in the
past 18 months, as some of the world’s largest unicorns filed documents to go public. Uber,
the most valuable unicorn in U.S. history before its IPO, raised $24.2 billion in funding
as a private company before going public in 2019. The staggering amounts of capital on
hand has allowed Uber to continue its core strategy of “disruption”, undercutting fares of
established taxi services and rideshare competitors. This strategy has led to rapid yearly
growth, but in the process, Uber has lost money on every transaction they make. The
company continues to bleed cash, has promised investors it will reach profitability in 2021
as it continues to widen its market share (Conger 2019). This appeal was successful—to
VCs, at least. When Uber released its S-1 in April of last year, analysts outside of the VC
bubble were able to peek under the ridesharer’s hood for the first time. In an attempt to spin
their weak profitability metrics, Uber made grandiose proclamations about their purpose.
The company’s stated mission was to “ignite opportunity by setting the world in motion”, it
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claimed that it was “fueling the future of independent work” through their controversial labor
tactics, and claimed to employ organizational synergy between platforms without actually
outlining how that synergy occurs (Uber Technologies 2019). When addressing the negative
margins it earns per ride, Uber employed a form of doublespeak: “We can choose to use
incentives, such as promotions for Drivers and consumers, to attract platform users on both
sides of our network, which can result in a negative margin until we reach su cient scale
to reduce incentives”. Uber’s language may have convinced VC firms to invest billions in
the private market, but retail investors were not as easily convinced. Uber’s stock dropped
10.75% on its first day of trading, and the stock has underperformed the market by nearly
20% since its IPO at the time of this writing.
An even larger IPO calamity occurred several months later with WeWork, a real estate firm
that provides shared workspaces for startups and entrepreneurs. Like Uber, WeWork was
able to achieve rapid revenue growth by spending billions of dollars of VC-funded money. As
of this writing, WeWork has raised 47 billion USD in venture capital deals. The majority of
capital raised comes from one source: Japanese VC firm SoftBank. WeWork was the corner-
stone investment in SoftBank’s Vision Fund, a growth stage venture fund with $100 billion of
cash on hand. By the end of 2018, WeWork was a behemoth; the company had become the
largest occupier of o ce space in both London and Manhattan and operated 400 locations
in 99 cities around the world (Landy 2018). Such staggering growth led the company to plan
an IPO for Fall 2019. That IPO ultimately never came to fruition—WeWork released its
o↵ering after investors had been burned by the IPOs of cash-burning unicorns like Uber. The
nonsensical language employed in their S-1 didn’t help either. WeWork’s mission statement?
“Elevate the world’s consciousness” (The We Company 2019). Attempting to latch onto the
clout of high-performing software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies, WeWork labeled itself as
the pioneer “space-as-a-service” company. In addition to WeWork’s exaggerated rhetoric,
the firm botched several key financial details in the report, further dooming its hopes of
6
going public at their desired price (Eaglesham & Brown 2019). The backlash ultimately
forced WeWork founder Adam Neumann to resign, and WeWork retracted all plans to go
public. Ultimately, WeWork was an example of the market correcting VC overenthusiasm;
most analysts and investors saw the preposterous language WeWork used as overly emotional
and a cover for their poor financials.
Market corrections do not always play out like the cases of Uber andWeWork. Consider the
drastic fall of Theranos, the most catastrophic example of overeager VC funding. Theranos
was a healthcare company that claimed to have the technology to conduct over 200 blood
tests using just a finger prick. Such a claim threatened to revolutionize the field of blood
testing. The founder of Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes, quickly became a mini-celebrity in her
own right. The CEO became noteworthy for her unnaturally baritone voice and frequent use
of black turtlenecks, ala Apple co-founder Steve Jobs. At the annual TEDMED healthcare
conference in 2014, Holmes laid out her grand vision using emotional pleas. The CEO noted
her grandfather’s sudden death from a form of skin cancer that quickly led to brain cancer.
Holmes’s grandfather died before she had a chance to say goodbye. Building o↵ of her
personal tragedy, Holmes proposed an ambitious vision for the future of healthcare:
“If I had one wish, standing here with all of you, it would be that today, just for a
minute, you think about the fact that we have this right, a human right, to engage
with information about ourselves, about our bodies, and for those that we love to
engage with information about themselves. And when we do that, we will change
our lives, and the lives of those we love will change. And we’ll begin to change our
healthcare system and our world.”
Holmes’s emotional appeals had almost no relation to her actual business. Its purpose was
to deeply resonate with potential investors, and it worked. Theranos quickly became one
of the most valuable unicorns in tech, garnering investments from high-profile figures in
all sectors of the economy. Walmart’s Walton family invested roughly 150 million USD in
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the company, current Education Secretary Betsy DeVos invested $100 million, and business
mogul Rupert Murdoch invested around $125 million (Carreyrou 2018). By 2015, Theranos’s
Board of Directors was an all-star team of political personalities; the board included former
Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz as well as former defense secretaries
and senators. These politicians had one thing in common: they had no experience in the
field of healthcare. Leveraging political capital and celebrity clout, Theranos was able to
attract people with large pocketbooks to invest, typically though emotional pleas like the
pitch Holmes gave in 2014. Ultimately, Theranos’s bold vision came crashing down. A series
of investigations from the Wall Street Journal alleged Theranos defrauded investors by lying
about the capabilities of its blood-testing technology. Eventual investigations by the Security
and Exchange Commission charged Holmes and Theranos with “massive fraud”. Theranos
had completely made up their success, lying about its advanced technology and overinflating
its revenue by 1000 times its true value to investors (Aiello 2018). The company’s assets
were liquidated in 2018; Holmes was given a 500,000 USD fine and was barred from serving
as an o cer or director of a public company for ten years (Thomas & Abelson 2018).
The cases of Uber, WeWork, and Theranos are emblematic of a growing trend among
unicorn firms. All three companies used elaborate rhetoric and emotional signals to craft
a narrative around its brand. These pitches, no matter how divorced from reality, proved
to attract billions of VC dollars and turned these firms into household names. Bombastic
language only goes so far, however. Once exposed to public scrutiny, each firm’s weak
financials caused its astronomical valuations to dwindle. In September 2019, New York
University marketing professor Scott Galloway dubbed the term “yogababble” to describe
the phenomena of firms using spiritual language to make their brand more attractive to
investors and consumers. “Overpromise and underdeliver has become a means for access
to cheap capital,” Galloway wrote in his blog. “The lines between charm, vision, bullsh*t,
and fraud have become so narrow as to be one line” (Galloway 2019). But how far does
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“yogababble” reach? Is it an occurrence that only applies to just a few VC-backed darlings,
or does the phenomena apply to all unicorns? In this paper, I will attempt to quantify the
rhetoric used by these unicorns, and establish relationships between this rhetoric and future
stock returns.
3. Literature Review
The history of venture capital dates back to the dawn of the internet era. Hellman and Puri
(2000) note that in the late 20th century, investors played an active role in the governance
of the ventures they invested in. Serving beyond the role of typical financial intermediaries,
venture capital firms helped startups build their internal organization, specifically their em-
ployee base. Some VC firms went as far as helping startups recruit an outsider to assume
the role of CEO. The obligations of a VC firm to its investments kept deal activity low in
the 1990s. Venture capital firms invested in just a few ventures because of the ample time
and resources it took to assume a central role in the invested firms.
Venture capital has undergone a paradigm shift in the last two decades. Supply shocks
in the technology sector have lowered the costs of starting new businesses, introducing new
investment opportunities that were previously not viable. Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf
(2018) remark that venture capital firms began to adopt a “spray and pray” strategy around
the mid-2000s, where an increased number of startup firms would receive funding without
the levels of governance that the VC firms previously employed. The authors attribute this
change to recent innovations such as cloud computing services, which allowed investors to
bypass purchasing expensive hardware for startups while the probability of the startup’s
success was still low. This change caused investments per year made by VCs in relevant
sectors to nearly double. Startups in sectors where the “spray-and-pray” approach was used
had a higher likelihood of failure, but if the startup were to receive another round of funding,
it had almost a 20% greater increase in valuation than startups in untreated sectors.
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Technological advancements have made it easier than ever to launch a startup. To
properly analyze the potential of these startups, VC firms use a multi-stage selection process
to weed through opportunities. Gompers et al. (2016) outline the so-called deal “pipeline”;
startups are initially evaluated by a member of the VC firm, a VC member then meets with
management from the startup, then the startup is brought to other members of the VC firm
for additional review. If the startup gets past further evaluation, the VC firm then conducts
a formal process of due diligence. A term sheet is then presented to the startup, and the deal
is formally agreed to. In a given year, VC firms conduct initial evaluations in roughly 250
early-stage firms. Of those 250 startups, only 60 firms receive a visit from a VC member.
Only a third of those 60 firms make it to partner review, and only five firms receive an o↵er
sheet for a deal. This remains the primary process in which VCs evaluate talent because it
puts a large emphasis on the meeting with management. Gompers et al. found that 95%
of VC respondents mentioned management teams as an important factor in investing, with
47% of VCs listing management as the most important factor when evaluating a startup.
In such a large market of startups, venture capital firms often turn to their perceptions of
strong leadership to make investments.
The nature of venture capital dictates that not every investment needs to be successful,
but available literature suggests that most unicorns are severely overvalued. Gornall &
Strebulaev (2017) develop a model to fairly value VC-backed securities. It is challenging to
properly value private unicorns due to their often extreme growth and illiquidity, so firms
typically reach a new valuation every time it o↵ers a new series of equity funding. VC firms
typically mark up the value of their investments to the price of the most recent funding
round, assuming that all of the company’s shares have the same price as the most recently
issued shares. Since each round of funding has di↵erent cash flow and control rights, this
assumption is false. For example, financial service provider Square went public at a share
price of 9 USD, 42 percent below the price Series E investors had paid for Square’s equity
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when the company was private. However, Series E investors were contractually protected
from risk and received extra shares until the stock hit a price of $18.56 per share. Since Series
E shares paid out more than other shares in downside scenarios and at least as much in upside
scenarios, it must be more worth more than the common stock shares. Faulty accounting
in markups was not unique to Square; Gornall & Strebulaev found that 53 of the 116 firms
studied lost their unicorn status once accounting for di↵erent cash flows in funding rounds.
The paper calls into question the manner in which these unicorns are valued; abnormally
high valuations behoof both the unicorn and the investor due to positive attention firms
receive once they reach unicorn status.
Knowing that venture capital firms prioritize management as a basis for future success, it
is important to assess the methods in which management can persuade VC firms into invest-
ing. Oral presentation skills have been proven to be an important factor in angel investors’
initial screening investment decisions (Clark 2008). Using questionnaire data from a UK
investor forum, Clark established a significant relationship between investors’ evaluations
of the content quality of entrepreneurs’ presentations and the likelihood that the investors
would be interested in pursuing an investment opportunity with the entrepreneurs. Presen-
tational factors tended to have the strongest influence on investors’ evaluations, although
the investors’ stated reasons for their evaluations were entirely based on non-presentational
criteria, such as specific information about the company and its market. Anglin et al. (2018)
demonstrated the power of positive language in public campaigns through a study of nearly
two thousand Kickstarter campaigns, finding a strong correlation between language that
evoked positive psychological capital and campaign success. A 10% increase in a campaign’s
use of positive psychological capital was associated with a 3% increase in the probability
the campaign succeeded. Parhankangas & Renko (2017) also use Kickstarter campaign out-
comes to analyze the rhetoric of social entrepreneurs. Their results indicate that specific and
precise language along with interactivity is a strong predictor of campaign success. Crowd-
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funding platforms like Kickstarter provide a strong analog for startup pitches to VC firms.
As with startup pitches, Kickstarter campaigns present a company’s best portrayal of itself.
Risk factors and poor financial data are absent from these pitch desks; instead, these com-
panies use persuasion and exaggeration tactics to attract investors. When VC firms meet
with management from potential portfolio companies, the meeting typically comes before
the startup’s financials are analyzed with due diligence. As a result, VCs are blind to any
fundamental problems with the company before it meets with investors.
The extent to which linguistic tone influences venture capital funding has not been well
studied; after all, pitches are closed-door and not publically accessible. Once a firm is public,
however, there is a vast trove of publically accessible financial documents available to be
analyzed. Loughran & McDonald (2011) applied linguistic analysis to financial documents by
creating word banks to properly assess positive and negative sentiment in a financial context.
Their research found that word lists that had been used in prior financial research such as the
Harvard Psychological Dictionary did not accurately categorize words in a financial context.
In a text analysis of more than 50 thousand corporate 10-K reports, almost 75% of negative
word counts reported by the Harvard list were attributable to words that are typically not
negative in financial contexts. Words such as CAPITAL, BOARD, and VICE were featured
in Harvard’s negative word bank, words that appear frequently in financial documents but
not in a negative context. Loughran & McDonald developed their own word list of negative
financial words, as well as banks for positive, uncertain, litigious, strong, and weak language.
Baginski et al. (2016) used financial word lists developed by Loughran & McDonald to
analyze forward-looking earnings forecasts, voluntary disclosures from management regard-
ing their firm’s future financial performance. To determine if a statement’s linguistic tones
impacted future security performance, Baginski sought to establish a relationship between
the management’s emotional sentiment in the forecast and its ensuing adjusted return. The
study finds that a one-standard deviation increase in a forecast’s positive tone is associated
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with a 3.36% increase in its adjusted stock return. The correlation strengthens when the
quantitative predictions of the forecast agree with its linguistic tone, specifically when a
quantitative forecast predicting good news confirms the positive linguistic tone of the fore-
cast.
Loughran & McDonald (2013) apply their own financial word lists to perform text
analysis on S-1 IPO documents. Building on Beatty & Ritter’s (1986) findings of a positive
correlation between investor uncertainty about an IPO’s value and its initial expected return,
the paper tests the relationship between textual sentiment in firms’ S-1 forms and their first-
day security returns. Uncertain, negative, and weak language was found to have a significant
correlation with first-day returns; a one-standard deviation increase in the proportion of
uncertain and negative language in the S-1 was associated with a 3% and 4% increase in
first-day returns, respectively. In the 60-day period following the o↵ering, firms with more
uncertain language in their S-1 were associated with higher volatilities in its stock returns,
implying that firms with higher levels of uncertainty prove more di cult to properly value.
The role of venture capital in IPO filings is examined by de Carvalho et al. (2020)
through the dynamics of earnings management. Earnings management is a term used to
describe deceptive practices and techniques in the production of a firm’s financial state-
ments. This practice is often used to mask poor financial performance and typically occurs
when management sets a predetermined target for earnings. The paper finds that firms
with venture capital investment engage in less earning management than firms without VC
investment. However, VC-sponsored firms engage in more earnings management than firms
without VC investment in periods leading up to the firm’s IPO. While non-VC sponsored
firms tend to inflate earnings during the IPO period and deflate earnings during the lock-up
and post-lockup period, VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings before its IPO and maintain
inflation until the lock-up period.
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4. Methodology
4a. Hypothesis
This thesis studies the rhetoric and performance of successfully-exited unicorns in an
attempt to establish a relationship between venture capital investment, narrative, and se-
curity performance. I present three hypotheses in an attempt to answer my overarching
research question: Can the language used by unicorn startup companies in their S-1 SEC
filings predict its eventual stock performance once public?
Existing literature on the subjects suggests relevant details to a potential hypothesis.
Analysis of public funding campaigns on Kickstarter by Anglin et al. as well as Parhankangas
& Renko suggests that positive and confident language in a company’s pitch is a costless and
e↵ective strategy in the e↵ort to gain funding. Additionally, surveys of VC firms conducted by
Gompers et al. indicate that a startup’s management team is the most important component
when evaluating future success. Considering these two findings, startup managers benefit
vastly from using rhetorical strategies in their pitches to VC firms. In fact, the research
suggests that VC firms may overlook a startup’s red flags if the firm’s management team
is perceived to be persuasive. Uber, WeWork, and Theranos were all founded by strong
personalities with grand visions for their company, and all three firms were able to amass
billions of dollars in VC funding while masking poor fundamentals. This association implies
that positive, persuasive language helps startups increase their likelihood of receiving VC
funding, and thus contributes to a di↵erence between the narrative that a company creates
and its actual business strategy.
As an analog for a unicorn startup’s pitch to investors, I will use the business summary
section in S-1 IPO filings. This section of the S-1 provides an overview of the firm and
includes details such as its mission statement, clients, supply chain, future strategy, and
revenues. Given the nature of pre-IPO investment rounds, as well as the incentives startups
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have to use positive rhetorical signals in their pitches, I hypothesize that unicorn firms with
high levels of venture capital investment will use more positive language in their business
summaries relative to firms with lower levels of venture capital investment.
Within the text of the S-1 form, I look to establish a relationship between a firm’s positive
language, as demonstrated in its business summary, and its risk, as determined by negative
and uncertain language in the risk factors section of the S-1. I hypothesize that firms with
relatively high levels of negative language in its risk factors will have relatively high levels
of positive language in its business summary; firms with higher disclosed risk will attempt
to compensate by using positive signals in its pitch.
I will use the results of the S-1 text analysis to establish relationships between textual
sentiment in financial disclosures and ensuing security returns. Drawing from the results
found by Loughran & McDonald (2013), I hypothesize that firms with abnormal amounts of
positive language in their business summary will have a negative association with ensuing
security performance.
4b. Data
This paper studies every company that completed an initial public o↵ering (IPO) on the
New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ at a market cap valuation of 1 billion USD or higher
since 2000. I use Crunchbase, a data-as-a-service platform for public and private companies,
to collect every requirement-meeting firm and its corresponding stock ticker. Using the
SEC EDGAR database, I convert each firm’s S-1 business summaries and risk factors into
separate text files. Certain firms that met the requirement but did not file an S-1, F-1, or
S-11 document were not included in the sample. A total of 233 firms were used.
Venture capital investment was determined using available data from Crunchbase, which
collects private venture funding round data for all firms. Crunchbase reports each firm’s
top five pre-IPO investors, and I collected each observed firm’s investors from the database.
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Additionally, I collected each venture capital firm that was featured on CBInsights’ 2019
Top 100 Venture Capitalists Ranking. CBInsights is an angel investing research platform
that, in conjunction with the New York Times, releases yearly rankings of the 100 top venture
capitalists in the world. 100 people from 64 firms were featured in the 2019 ranking. To
determine a variable indicating venture capital investment in an observed firm, I created a
binary variable which took a value of 1 if one of the firm’s top five investors was included in
the CBInsights ranking. 90 of the 233 observed firms qualified for this distinction.
Text analysis for both business summaries and risk factors are done through the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) module, a proprietary software program that counts and
processes words into psychologically-relevant categories. The analysis is conducted using two
di↵erent word banks.
The first analysis is done using LIWC-created psychological categories. Table 1 displays
the LIWC categories relevant to this thesis, its frequencies in di↵erent forms of text, as well
as its frequencies within the sample of business summaries and risk factors. Outputs for
business summaries and risk factors were taken as an average of all firms recorded in the
sample, while output for other forms of text was taken from data reported in the 2015 LIWC
language manual (Pennebaker et. al, 2015). Except for the four summary variables (Analytic,
Clout, Authentic, and Tone), all mean values in Table 1 are expressed as a percentage of
total words used in the sampled text. The four summary variables are percentiles based on
standardized scores from large comparison samples. LIWC is not transparent about what
types of language are factored into the four summary variables, but the variables are based
on previous research conducted by the developers of the software. The categories are defined
as such:
• Clout: category of words indicative of certainty, dominance, and confidence (Kacewicz
et al., 2012)
• Authenticity: to what extent the language used is personal and self-revealing, rather
16
than detached and guarded (Newman et al., 2003)
• Analytic: the degree of analytical, logical and consistent thinking, as opposed to more
intuitive, narrative writing (Pennebaker et al., 2014)
• Tone: the degree of positive emotional tone, as measured by the di↵erence between
LIWC scores for negative language and positive language (Cohn et al., 2004)
• Emotion: levels of positive and negative emotional words
Prospectus
Summaries
Risk
Factors
Blogs Nov-
els
Natural
Speech
New York
Times
Clout 89.11 83.6 47.87 75.37 56.27 68.17
Authenticity 21.59 15.19 60.93 21.56 61.32 24.84
Analytic 93.07 86.31 49.89 70.33 18.43 92.57
Tone 65.09 45.82 54.5 37.06 79.29 43.61
Positive
Emotion
2.88 2.95 3.66 2.67 5.31 2.32
Negative
Emotion
0.73 1.87 2.06 2.08 1.19 1.45
Table 1: Prospectus Summary and Risk Factor LIWC textual sentiment as compared to other forms of text,
in percentages
The second text analysis is done in the LIWC module using Loughran and McDonald’s
(2011) financial sentiment word lists. These word lists have been taken from a dictionary of
words and word counts from all 10-Ks filed from 1994 to 2008. Average outputs for both
business summary texts, as well as risk factors, are shown in Table 2. The categories for the
word list is defined as such:
• Fin-Neg: negative sentiment in a financial context. The category includes 2,337 words.
• Fin-Pos: positive sentiment in a financial context. The category includes only 353
words, substantially lower than the number of words in the Fin-Neg category. Loughran
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&McDonald attempted to remove any qualifying positive words, focusing only on words
unilateral in a positive tone.
• Fin-Unc: words denoting uncertainty, specifically imprecision. The category includes
285 words.
• MW-Strong and MW-Weak: strong and weak modal words as developed by Jordan
(1999). There are 19 MW-Strong words and 27 MW-Weak words.
Prospectus Summaries Risk Factors
Fin-Neg 0.72 3.3
Fin-Pos 1.81 0.96
Fin-Unc 0.88 0.96
MW-Strong 0.36 0.58
MW-Weak 0.32 2.12
Table 2: Prospectus Summary and Risk Factor textual sentiment in Loughran & McDonald’s word banks,
in percentages
To compare text analysis outputs to successive security returns, I used Koyfin, a financial
research database, to calculate post-IPO stock returns. Returns were found for each firm
the day, week, month, and year after each firm’s stock went public. Daily returns were
calculated by finding the percentage change in security price from the beginning of the day’s
trading to the close. Each percentage return was then subtracted by the market’s return
for the given period of time to get the abnormal return of the security. Since every return
observed was following the stock’s IPO, the beta value for each stock is assumed to be 1.
The market return was calculated using the S&P 500, a market index that measures the
stock performance of 500 large-cap stocks. A company’s assigned industry was determined
by Financial Visualizations, another financial research database.
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4c. Empirical Strategy
To determine the e↵ect of venture capital investment on a firm’s S-1 language, I estimate
the following OLS regression models:
Yib =  0 +  1V Ci +  i + ✏i
Yir =  0 +  1V Ci +  i + ✏i
Where:
• Yib measures language output in the business summary section of each observation’s
S-1 document
• Yir measures language output in the risk factor section of each observation’s S-1 doc-
ument
• VCi is a dummy variable indicating whether a top venture capital firm is one of the
observed firm’s five largest investors.
• gi is a dummy variable controlling for a firm’s industry. Sectors included are technology,
finance, services, consumer goods, basic materials, healthcare, industrial goods, and
utilities.
• ei is an error variable.
This model addresses my hypothesis that firms with investment from top VC firms will use
more positive language in their business summaries relative to firms without venture capital
investment.
To determine the e↵ect of a firm’s risk on the types of language it uses when summarizing
its business, I estimate the following OLS regression model:
Yib =  0 +  1Xir +  i + ✏i
Where:
• Yib measures language output in the business summary section of each observation’s
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S-1 document
• Xir measures language output in the risk factor section of each observation’s S-1 docu-
ment
• gi is a dummy variable controlling for a firm’s industry. Sectors included are technology,
finance, services, consumer goods, basic materials, healthcare, industrial goods, and
utilities.
• ei is an error variable.
This model addresses my hypothesis that firms with relatively high levels of negative lan-
guage in their risk factors will have relatively high levels of positive language in its business
summary.
To determine the e↵ect of a firm’s S-1 textual sentiment on its stock performance once public,
I estimate the following regression model:
ARit =  0 +  1Xip +  i + ✏i
Where:
• ARit measures the return of the firm’s stock price in percentages when adjusted by
the market’s performance in the same time, ARit = Rit - Rmt
• Xib measures language output in the business summary section of each observation’s
S-1 document
• gi is a dummy variable controlling for a firm’s industry
• ei is an error variable
This model addresses my hypothesis that abnormal amounts of positive language in their
business summary will have a negative association with its security performance after going
public.
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5. Results
Table 3: Impact of Venture Capital Investment on S-1 LIWC Language
(1) (2) (3) (4)
posemo ps posemo ps negemo ps negemo ps
top 5 vc 0.261⇤⇤ 0.219⇤ 0.00617 0.0332
(0.0920) (0.0963) (0.0526) (0.0477)
technology 0.529⇤⇤⇤ 0.0210
(0.0887) (0.0596)
financial 0.799⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤
(0.0988) (0.0902)
services 0.524⇤⇤⇤
(0.0879)
consumer goods 0.623⇤⇤⇤ -0.191⇤⇤
(0.153) (0.0620)
basic materials -0.218⇤⇤ 0.310⇤⇤
(0.0786) (0.108)
healthcare 0.00119 0.289⇤⇤⇤
(0.0875) (0.0840)
industrial goods -0.0886 0.0600
(0.202) (0.0998)
utilities 0.685 0.00633
(0.420) (0.123)
cons 2.850⇤⇤⇤ 2.400 0.615⇤⇤⇤ 0.543⇤⇤⇤
(0.0529) (.) (0.0297) (0.0551)
N 232 232 232 232
adj. R2 0.032 0.153 -0.004 0.066
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 3 displays the regression output testing the hypothesis that venture capital invest-
ment a↵ects a firm’s use of emotional language when summarizing their business, using the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count module. The variables tested are defined as follows:
• top 5 vc is a binary variable that indicates whether the observed firm has received
investment from a top venture capital firm, namely whether a top VC firm was one of
the observed firm’s top five investors.
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• posemo bs is a variable totaling the percentage of positive emotional language in a
firm’s business summary section, as determined by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count word bank.
• negemo bs is a variable totaling the percentage of negative emotional language in a
firm’s business summary section, as determined by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count word bank.
The regression establishes a significant positive correlation between venture capital invest-
ment in a firm and the firm’s levels of positive language in its business summaries. Firms
that receive investment from an elite venture capital firm are associated with a 0.219% in-
crease in levels of positive emotional language in its S-1 business summary, controlling for
the firm’s industry. This e↵ect is significant at the 1% level without industry controls, and
at the 5% level with industry controls. Firms that receive investment from an elite venture
capital firm are associated with a 0.0332% increase in levels of negative emotional language
in its S-1 business summary, controlling for the firm’s industry. This e↵ect is not significant
at the 5% level and contains standard errors higher than coe cients when controlling for
industry.
When using Loughran & McDonald’s financial sentiment word lists, I found both a pos-
itive and negative impact of venture capital investment on textual sentiment in business
summaries. The coe cients for both positive and negative language are very weak, as the
standard errors of the regression were larger than the coe cients when industry controls are
applied. The LIWC word bank is a more useful variable for this analysis than Loughran
& McDonald’s financial sentiment dictionary because the LIWC list acts as a more e↵ec-
tive gauge on positive psychological capital. Loughran & McDonald’s dictionary is not a
relevant variable for business summaries because financial context is not necessary for busi-
ness summaries. Summaries are written in a manner to catch the reader’s attention and
retain engagement, so a general text analysis that captures emotional sentiment serves as a
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more e↵ective gauge for positive language than a word bank that only captures positive and
negative financial sentiment.
Table 4: Impact of Venture Capital Investment on S-1 LIWC Summary Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log analytic bs log authentic bs log clout bs log tone bs
top 5 vc -0.0143⇤⇤⇤ -0.0451 0.00952 0.0383
(0.00352) (0.0452) (0.0111) (0.0292)
technology -0.0492⇤⇤⇤ 0.474⇤⇤⇤ 0.140⇤⇤⇤ 0.0374
(0.00302) (0.0440) (0.00902) (0.0274)
financial -0.0330⇤⇤⇤ 0.427⇤⇤⇤ 0.118⇤⇤⇤ 0.0830⇤⇤
(0.00374) (0.0661) (0.0203) (0.0268)
services -0.0479⇤⇤⇤ 0.646⇤⇤⇤ 0.150⇤⇤⇤ 0.0428
(0.00357) (0.0429) (0.0148) (0.0319)
consumer goods -0.0595⇤⇤⇤ 0.482⇤⇤⇤ 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.129⇤⇤⇤
(0.00775) (0.104) (0.0280) (0.0360)
basic materials -0.0385⇤⇤⇤ 0.595⇤⇤⇤ -0.00370 -0.264⇤⇤⇤
(0.00848) (0.0838) (0.0454) (0.0447)
healthcare -0.0103⇤ 0.381⇤⇤⇤ -0.119⇤⇤⇤ -0.155⇤⇤⇤
(0.00484) (0.0560) (0.0348) (0.0312)
industrial goods -0.0449⇤⇤⇤ 0.695⇤⇤⇤ 0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.135
(0.00803) (0.106) (0.0202) (0.0688)
utilities -0.0128⇤ 0.428⇤⇤⇤ 0.0250 0.0728
(0.00532) (0.0545) (0.0138) (0.108)
cons 4.584⇤⇤⇤ 2.366⇤⇤⇤ 4.337 4.175
(2.39e-09) (2.66e-08) (.) (.)
N 232 232 232 232
adj. R2 0.291 0.077 0.400 0.163
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 4 displays the impact of venture capital investment on LIWC summary category
variables. I have taken the log of each variable to prevent a non-linear relationship. The
variables are defined as follows:
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• log analytic is a variable denoting the degree of analytical, logical and consistent
thinking, as opposed to more intuitive, narrative writing (Pennebaker et al., 2014)
• log authenticity is a variable denoting to what extent the language used is personal
and self-revealing, rather than detached and guarded (Newman et al., 2003)
• log clout is a variable denoting words indicative of certainty, dominance, and confi-
dence (Kacewicz et al., 2012)
• log tone is a variable denoting the degree of positive emotional tone, as measured by
the di↵erence between LIWC scores for negative language and positive language (Cohn
et al., 2004)
The regression finds a significant negative correlation between venture capital investment
and the degree of a firm’s analytic writing in its S-1 business summary. Firms that receive
investment from an elite venture capital firm are associated with a 1.64% decrease in lev-
els of analytical language in its S-1 business summary, as established by Pennebaker et al
(2014). Pennebaker used the Categorical-Dynamic Index to develop a binary metric con-
trasting cognitive complexity (greater article and preposition use) with time-based narrative
writing, which uses more pronouns and auxiliary verbs. A negative coe cient for levels of
analytical language implies that firms with venture capital investment are more likely to use
a dynamic, narrative style in their business summary, controlling for industry. This corre-
lation is significant at the 0.1% level. There is no discernable connection between venture
capital investment and business summary language for the three other summary variables.
Most regressions have a very low R2 and contain high standard errors.
Table 5 displays the impact of venture capital investment on textual sentiment in the
risk factor section of S-1s, as measured by both the LIWC and Loughran & McDonald word
bank. The dependent variables are defined as follows:
• posemo rf is a variable totaling the percentage of positive emotional language in a
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Table 5: Impact of VC Investment on S-1 Risk Factor Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
posemo rf negemo rf liwc rf di↵ all positive rf all negative rf lm rf di↵
top 5 vc -0.0964 0.0741 -0.171⇤ 0.0179 0.220⇤ -0.161⇤
(0.0507) (0.0428) (0.0748) (0.0310) (0.104) (0.0648)
technology 0.547⇤⇤⇤ 0.313⇤⇤⇤ 0.234⇤⇤ 0.0677 0.0904 -0.0535
(0.0494) (0.0410) (0.0709) (0.0384) (0.124) (0.0828)
financial 0.809⇤⇤⇤ 0.294⇤⇤⇤ 0.515⇤⇤⇤ 0.0201 -0.116 0.0436
(0.0657) (0.0620) (0.102) (0.0600) (0.185) (0.134)
services 0.651⇤⇤⇤ 0.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.430⇤⇤⇤
(0.0536) (0.0392) (0.0675)
consumer goods 0.453⇤⇤⇤ 0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.112 0.111 0.0742 -0.0833
(0.0991) (0.0948) (0.155) (0.0667) (0.220) (0.164)
basic materials 0.518⇤⇤⇤ 0.287⇤⇤⇤ 0.230 0.00169 0.112 0.0130
(0.0875) (0.0847) (0.128) (0.0549) (0.236) (0.159)
healthcare 0.801⇤⇤⇤ 0.0946 0.706⇤⇤⇤ 0.288⇤⇤⇤ 0.214 0.0914
(0.0869) (0.0513) (0.125) (0.0648) (0.141) (0.102)
industrial goods 0.697⇤⇤⇤ 0.466⇤⇤⇤ 0.231 0.00598 0.705⇤ -0.351
(0.131) (0.0771) (0.180) (0.0640) (0.299) (0.196)
utilities 0.744⇤⇤⇤ 0.124 0.620⇤ -0.0453 -0.0750 0.0517
(0.153) (0.0979) (0.250) (0.0878) (0.249) (0.136)
cons 2.370⇤⇤⇤ 1.570⇤⇤⇤ 0.800⇤⇤⇤ 1.468⇤⇤⇤ 7.105⇤⇤⇤ -2.266⇤⇤⇤
(5.32e-08) (6.79e-08) (6.66e-08) (0.0331) (0.0992) (0.0744)
N 232 232 232 232 232 232
adj. R2 0.098 0.050 0.101 0.090 0.024 0.018
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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firm’s risk factor section, as determined by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
word bank.
• negemo rf is a variable totaling the percentage of negative emotional language in a
firm’s risk factor section, as determined by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count word
bank.
• liwc rf di↵ is a variable calculating the di↵erence between the percentage of positive
emotional language and the percentage of negative emotional language in risk factors,
as determined by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count word bank. A positive output
for this variable indicates that the risk factor text contains more positive than negative
language.
• all positive rf is a variable totaling the percentage of positive financial language in a
firm’s risk factor section, as determined by Loughran and McDonald’s financial senti-
ment word bank. This includes Laughran and McDonald’s positive and strong modal
word lists.
• all negative rf is a variable totaling the percentage of negative financial language
in a firm’s risk factor section, as determined by Loughran and McDonald’s financial
sentiment word bank. This includes Laughran and McDonald’s negative, uncertain,
litigious, and weak modal word lists.
• lm rf di↵ is a variable calculating the di↵erence between the percentage of positive
financial language and the percentage of negative financial language in risk factors, as
determined by Loughran and McDonald’s financial sentiment word bank.
The risk factor section of the S-1 is intended to disclose significant factors that make a
firm’s IPO especially risky or uncertain. Companies are legally required by Item 503(c) of
Regulation S-K to disclose all potential risks that the company faces. In this paper, I use
the risk factor section as a proxy for a firm’s perceived risk. The regression output indicates
that for both the LIWC and L&M word bank, there is a significant positive correlation
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between venture capital investment and negative language in S-1 risk factors. Given that
Laughran and McDonald’s financial dictionary is specifically equipped to analyze financial
texts, it is important that significance was found at the 5% level for both negative financial
language and the di↵erence between positive and negative language. These findings imply
that unicorn firms with venture capital investment contain higher levels of risk than firms
without investment.
Table 6: Impact of Negative Language in Risk Factors on Positive Language in Business Summaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liwc bs emodi↵ lm bs emodi↵ liwc bs emodi↵ lm bs emodi↵
all negative rf -0.126 -0.0684 -0.0929 -0.0726
(0.0690) (0.0683) (0.0671) (0.0681)
technology 0.0805 0.0163
(0.141) (0.144)
financial 0.0697 -0.404⇤
(0.155) (0.172)
consumer goods 0.312 0.362⇤
(0.198) (0.172)
basic materials -1.077⇤⇤⇤ -0.698⇤
(0.163) (0.283)
healthcare -0.726⇤⇤⇤ -0.857⇤⇤⇤
(0.135) (0.190)
industrial goods -0.643⇤ -0.0303
(0.251) (0.362)
utilities 0.163 -0.639⇤⇤
(0.432) (0.213)
cons 3.248⇤⇤⇤ 1.133⇤ 3.078⇤⇤⇤ 1.298⇤⇤
(0.505) (0.485) (0.474) (0.462)
N 233 233 233 233
adj. R2 0.009 -0.000 0.162 0.125
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 6 displays the relationship between language within the S-1. I look to establish a
relationship between positive language in business summaries and negative language in risk
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factors to see if firms that use higher levels of positive language in their business summaries
are associated with higher levels of negative language in their risk factors. I hypothesize
that firms with higher levels of negative sentiment in their risk factors will be associated
with higher levels of positive language in their business summaries, as riskier firms may be
incentivized to use rhetorical strategies to make their prospects more appealing to investors.
The regression shows no significant connection between the two variables for either dictionary.
Both word banks have negative coe cients, implying that firms with higher levels of negative
risk factor language also have higher levels of negative language in business summaries. These
findings stand in stark contrast to my hypothesis, which suggested that the opposite would
occur. The standard errors for these regressions are also very high, suggesting that there is
not a significant connection between the two parts of the S-1.
Figure 3: Impact of LIWC Emotional Language on First-Day Stock Returns
Figure 3 displays the relationship between a firm’s net positive emotional language in its
business summary (measured in the percentage of the entire text) and its first-day stock
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returns (measured in decimals) once public. The graph shows a weak negative correlation
between the two variables; a one percent increase in net positive emotional language in
business summaries results in a 0.9% decrease in the stock’s abnormal return on its first day
of public trading. This regression has high standard errors, which increase when industry
controls are applied, and an extremely low R2 output.
Figure 4: Impact of L&M Negative Financial Language on First-Day Stock Returns
Figure 4 shows the relationship between a firm’s negative financial language in its risk factors
(measured in the percentage of the entire text) and its first-day stock returns (measured in
decimals) once public. There is virtually no correlation between the two variables, as the
standard errors of this regression are twice as large as the coe cient. The regressions in
Figure 3 and Figure 4 are both adversely a↵ected by large outliers. However, even when
observations with stock returns exceeding 30% and lower than 20% were dropped from the
regression, there were no significant correlations established between S-1 language and daily
returns.
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Table 7: Impact of Language and Investment on Weekly and Monthly Stock Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mar week mar week mar week mar month mar month mar month
liwc bs emodi↵ -0.0320⇤⇤ -0.000915
(0.0111) (0.0268)
technology -0.0118 -0.0149 -0.0127 -0.0421 -0.0480 -0.0316
(0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0223) (0.0391) (0.0426) (0.0464)
financial -0.00291 -0.00673 -0.00841 -0.0259 -0.0327 -0.0324
(0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0267) (0.0435) (0.0472) (0.0407)
consumer goods 0.101⇤ 0.0908 0.0897 0.168⇤ 0.162⇤ 0.165⇤
(0.0491) (0.0481) (0.0491) (0.0785) (0.0753) (0.0741)
basic materials -0.0226 0.0119 0.00784 0.0377 0.0380 0.0269
(0.0278) (0.0241) (0.0238) (0.0365) (0.0419) (0.0377)
healthcare 0.0154 0.0378 0.0396 0.0773 0.0692 0.0848
(0.0369) (0.0379) (0.0374) (0.0695) (0.0769) (0.0777)
industrial goods 0.0306 0.0537⇤ 0.0490⇤ 0.0643 0.0676 0.0531
(0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0225) (0.0501) (0.0531) (0.0521)
utilities -0.00531 -0.0120 -0.0127 -0.00532 -0.0122 -0.00801
(0.0234) (0.0208) (0.0186) (0.0527) (0.0554) (0.0569)
log authentic bs -0.00632 -0.0338
(0.0262) (0.0505)
top 5 vc -0.00888 -0.0373
(0.0212) (0.0384)
cons 0.0838⇤⇤ 0.0254 0.0108 0.0199 0.119 0.0295
(0.0279) (0.0810) (0.0137) (0.0494) (0.171) (0.0280)
N 233 233 232 233 233 232
adj. R2 0.045 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.037 0.042
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 7 shows the relationship between relevant variables and both weekly and monthly stock
returns. There is a significant negative correlation between positive emotional language and
weekly stock returns; a one percent increase in net levels of positive emotional language in
a firm’s business summary results in a 3.2% decrease in weekly returns. The e↵ect remains
negative for monthly returns but is very small and not significant. The impact of dynamic
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language on stock returns is weakly negative for both weekly and monthly returns. There is
no discernable correlation between venture capital investment and short-term stock returns
post-IPO.
6. Conclusion
Presentation and rhetoric are both vital components of a company’s pitch to investors.
This paper collects and analyzes venture capital interest in every firm since 2000 that went
public on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ at a market cap of 1 billion USD or
above. Using text analysis software, an OLS regression model was estimated to evaluate
the relationship between venture capital investment in unicorns and unicorns’ rhetorical
strategies in their business summary. The regression found that venture-funded firms use
higher levels of positive emotional language when summarizing their business relative to firms
without venture funding. Venture-funded firms are also more likely to use dynamic, time-
based narrative writing in their summaries. Firms that receive funding are correlated with
higher levels of negative financial language in the risk factor section of their S-1, an analog
to a firm’s risk. Despite the significant relationship between VC investment and rhetorical
text strategy, there is no observable connection between VC investment and post-IPO stock
returns. Additionally, it does not appear that the rhetorical strategy in the business summary
section of the S-1 has a significant influence on stock returns once the firm is public.
Existing literature supports the relationship between venture capital investment and
rhetorical strategies. Previous research suggests that venture capital firms prioritize man-
agement when selecting startups to invest in (Gompers et al. 2016). Due to the nature of
the VC process, a startup’s initial pitch to investors has large weight to the likelihood of
eventual investment. This stresses the significance of an e↵ective pitch; Clark (2008) noted
that investors are more likely to show interest in investing in a startup that had a strong
presentation, regardless of the strength of the company or its market fit. The implication
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that venture capital firms are more likely to invest in firms with rhetorical strength suggests
that my findings could su↵er from simultaneity bias. In this case, it is unclear whether
venture capital investment causes startup companies (that later become unicorns) to build
a rhetorical narrative about its firm, or if venture capitalists tend to invest in firms that
already have strong rhetoric. It is also worth considering that out of the hundreds of startup
companies that elite venture capital firms invest in, the unicorns studied in this paper are
already considered extreme successes. The eventual goal for venture capital investments is
to lead startups to a successful exit in the form of an IPO, as this is one of the only ways for
investors to reap the monetary rewards of early investments. As a result, my data set may
su↵er from sampling bias.
Further research could move beyond the context of exited unicorns and develop a much
larger sample size to analyze. This would likely allow for a more accurate assessment of
the relationship between VC investment and stock returns. Additional time would help
grow a larger sample size for exited unicorns, as there are currently more unicorns that are
privately-held than publically-held. The rapid, recent growth of unicorns calls for further
investigation regarding these special firms, which will help specify academic research about
this subject.
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